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The quantum states corresponding to a secret key are characterized by the so-called private states,
where the key part consisting of a secret key is shielded by the additional systems. Based on the
construction, it was shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states. In this
work, we consider the shielded two-qubit states in key distillation scenario and derive the conditions
that a secret key can be distilled using the recurrence protocol or the two-way classical distillation,
the advantage distillation together with one-way post-processing. From the security conditions, it
is shown that a secret key can be distilled from bound entangled states in a much wider range. In
addition, we consider the case that the white noise is added to quantum states, and show that the
classical distillation protocol still works under certain amount of the noise although the recurrence
protocol not.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Entanglement, i.e. quantum correlations that cannot
be prepared by local operations and classical communi-
cation (LOCC), has been the resource for efficient quan-
tum information processing. One of the important ap-
plications is that entangled states can be used to dis-
tribute a secret key [1]. For instance, in the Bennett-
Brassard (BB84) protocol [2], if entangled states shared
by two honest parties are not too noisy, then they can be
used to establish a secret key between two honest par-
ties, Alice and Bob, applying single-copy level measure-
ment and one-way post-processing for error correction
and privacy amplification. It is the key idea in the secu-
rity proof that distilling the maximally entangled state,
|φ1〉 = (|00〉+|11〉)/
√
2, immediately implies that a secret
key is obtained [3]. This is based on two characteristics
of the entangled state. First, since the state is pure, two
honest parties do not share any correlation with envi-
ronment, i.e. the probability distribution with an eaves-
dropper is of the form, PABE(a, b, e) = PAB(a, b)PE(e).
Second, measuring copies of the state in the computa-
tional basis, two parties share the perfect correlation, i.e.
PAB(0, 0) = PAB(1, 1) = 1/2.
If the limitation on technology of Alice and Bob is
relaxed, i.e. two honest parties are assumed to apply co-
herent quantum operations over shared quantum states,
then the so-called distillable entangled states [4], those
entangled states that can be distilled to the maximally
entangled states by local operation and classical commu-
nication(LOCC), can be used to establish a secret key
between honest parties. Then, one can ask if the en-
tanglement distillability is the characterization of key-
distillability? Or, more generally, for given quantum
states, is it possible to decide if a secret key can be dis-
tilled? This has been referred to as one of the open prob-
lems in Quantum Information Theory, being a funda-
mental issue on the compatibility between entanglement
and secrecy [5]. Along this line, it is clear that separable
states cannot be used in secret key distillation [6, 7]. It
is also known that all entangled states can be used to
establish classical secret correlations, those classical cor-
relations that cannot be prepared by local operation and
public communication [6, 7].
In Ref. [8], the quantum states that correspond to a
secret key are characterized by private states γABA′B′ as
follows,
γABA′B′ = UABA′B′(|φ1〉AB〈φ1| ⊗ ρA′B′)U †ABA′B′ , (1)
where ρA′B′ can be any quantum state, and UABA′B′ is
a unitary operation called twisting of the following form
UABA′B′ =
∑
i,j
|ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ UA
′B′
ij . (2)
A secret key can be obtained by measuring the systems
A and B, which are called the key part that are directly
used to distilling a secret key. The other systems A′ and
B′ are called shield parts that are only used to shield
the key part. It can be now said that the key-distillable
states are those quantum states that can be distilled to
private states by LOCC. Based on the private states dis-
tillation scenario, it was shown that there exist bound
entangled states from which a secret key can be distilled
[8]. This was the first line that discovers the incompat-
ibility between entanglement and secrecy properties of
quantum states. Therefore, it turns out that the set of
key-distillable states is strictly larger than that of distil-
lable entangled states.
The bound entangled states constructed in [8] is of the
following form,
ρABA′B′ = |φ1〉〈φ1|AB ⊗ σ1 + |φ2〉〈φ2|AB ⊗ σ2
+ |φ3〉〈φ3|AB ⊗ σ3 + |φ4〉〈φ4|AB ⊗ σ4, (3)
where σj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, are unnormalized shield states
of systems A′B′ and |φi〉, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 are Bell states,
|φ2〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2, |φ3〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/
√
2 and
|φ4〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/
√
2. Throughout, we call the
state in (3) as shielded two-qubit states. The shield
2states in Ref.[8] are separable and constructed such that
the state ρABA′B′ is of non-positive-partial-transpose
(NPPT). The recurrence protocol in Ref. [4] that was
used to distill maximally entangled states was applied to
the key parts of the state ρABA′B′ in order to distill a
secret key [8]. Since the state is of NPPT it is clear that
no maximally entangled state can be distilled, however, it
was shown that the resulting state converges to a private
state by the recurrence protocol.
In this paper, we consider the shield two-qubit states in
key distillation scenario. We apply two distillation tech-
niques, the recurrence protocol, and the two-way clas-
sical communication protocol, the advantage distillation
together with the standard one-way post-processing for
error-correction and privacy amplification. We then de-
rive the conditions that a secret key can be distilled by
the quantum and classical protocols, respectively, and
show that bound entangled sates in a much wider range
are turned out to be key-distillable. We also show that
the classical distillation protocol is robust when the white
noise is added, while the recurrence protocol not.
II. TWO-QUBITS WITH SHIELD SYSTEMS
Let us begin with reviewing properties of private states
in (3), where two honest parties hold both systems: one
is the key part AB to be directly used for key distillation,
and the other is the shield part A′B′. In fact, all private
states are equivalent up to twisting operations. In Ref.
[9], it was shown that for ρABA′B′ in (3), there exists a
twisting U such that ρABA′B′ = UσABA′B′U
† in which
the key part, σAB = trA′B′ [UσABA′B′U
†], becomes
σAB = λ1|φ1〉〈φ1|+ λ2|φ2〉〈φ2|
+ λ3|φ3〉〈φ3|+ λ4|φ4〉〈φ4|, (4)
with
λ1,2 =
1
2
(‖σ1 + σ2‖ ± ‖σ1 − σ2‖),
λ3,4 =
1
2
(‖σ3 + σ4‖ ± ‖σ3 − σ4‖). (5)
Note that there exists an LOCC scheme to estimates the
parameters λi(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) in the above [10].
The twisting operations could be in general non-local
quantum operations. They are, however, useful to
analyze the so-called classical-classical-quantum(ccq)
correlations of Alice, Bob and Eve when Alice and Bob
measure their key parts in the computational basis
{|0〉, |1〉} and obtain classical raw keys. For the full
generality, Eve is supposed to be able to postpone
measurement. The important property of the twisting
operations is that, the ccq correlations among them do
not depend on application of twisting operations, i.e. the
ccq correlations are the same for both states, ρABA′B′
and the twisted one UρABA′B′U
† [9, 10].
Theorem ([9]). For any state ρABA′B′ of the form
in (3) and any twisting operation U , the states ρABA′B′
and UρABA′B′U
† have the same ccq correlations with
respect to measurement in the computational basis.
That is, the corresponding ccq states are equivalent.
Therefore, when sharing copies of the state ρABA′B′ , if
two honest parties measure the key parts and apply clas-
sical distillation protocol, the security can be equivalently
analyzed with the twisted one UρABA′B′U
†, in order to
decide whether the state ρABA′B′ is key-distillable. The
precondition for key distillability [6, 7] is that the key
part σAB is entangled for some U . For the twisting U
achieving (4) and (5), the key part is entangled if and
only if λ1 > λ2 + λ3 + λ4 [11]. This can be equivalently
expressed in terms of shield states (5)
‖σ1 − σ2‖ > ‖σ3 + σ4‖. (6)
In the key distillation scenario, we will consider the
case of so-called collective attacks, in which the shared
states of two honest parties are N copies of the same
states, ρ⊗NABA′B′ . That is, the collective attacks corre-
spond to the case that Eve interacts with individual
quantum state of two honest parties. This, however, does
not lose the generality in proving the security against gen-
eral attacks, i.e. the general security, in the asymptotic
limit N → ∞. Thanks to the quantum de Finetti theo-
rem, it turns out that the general attacks are not more
powerful than the collective attacks for sufficiently large
N [12]. The security analysis can therefore be hugely
simplified to the case of collective attacks.
III. DISTILLING KEY BY THE RECURRENCE
PROTOCOL
We now apply the recurrence protocol to distill a secret
key from ρ⊗NABA′B′ . The recurrence protocol applies only
to the key parts and works as follows [4]. Two honest
parties first take two copies of the state, ρA1B1A′1B′1 ⊗
ρA2B2A′2B′2 . The CNOT operations are applied to the
local systems A1A2 and B1B2, respectively, where A1
and B1 are controlled systems and A2 and B2 are target
ones. Then, two honest parties measure the key parts of
the second pair, A2 and B2, in the computational basis,
and communicate if their measurement outcomes are the
same. If measurement outcomes are the same, two honest
parties keep the resulting quantum state and repeat the
procedure with the remaining pairs. If not, they start the
protocol with another pairs. Let σm denote the resulting
state after passing m repetitions of the protocol. If there
exists a private state to which σm converges asm tends to
be large, it is concluded that ρABA′B′ is key-distillable.
In Ref. [8, 9], the useful relation was shown that, the
state σm converges to a private state as m becomes large
if and only if ‖〈00|σm|11〉‖ converges to 1/2. Therefore,
σm converges to a private state by the recurrence protocol
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‖〈00|σm|11〉‖ = ‖σ1 − σ2‖
m
2‖σ1 + σ2‖m + 2‖σ3 + σ4‖m (7)
can be arbitrarily close to 1/2 as repetitions m become
very large. For such a convergence the shield states
should fulfill that
‖σ1 + σ2‖ = ‖σ1 − σ2‖, (8)
since it holds that ‖σ1 + σ2‖ ≥ ‖σ1 − σ2‖ > ‖σ3 + σ4‖,
where the second inequality follows from the condition
in (6). The condition (8) is in fact equivalent to the
orthogonality, tr[σ1σ2] = 0 [13].
Proposition 1. A secret key can be distilled from
copies of the state ρABA′B′ in (3) using the recurrence
protocol if shield sates σ1 and σ2 in (3) are orthogonal.
We now reconsider the bound entangled state in Ref.
[8] which takes the shield states as follows,
σ1 = p(
ρs + ρa
2
)⊗l, σ2 = pρ
⊗l
s ,
σ3,4 = (
1
2
− p)(ρs + ρa
2
)⊗l, (9)
where ρa(s) is the normalized d-dimensional projection
operator onto asymmetric(symmetric) space. The state
ρABA′B′ remains positive under partial transpose if and
only if p ∈ (0, 1/3] and p ≤ (1 + (d/(d − 1))l)−1. From
the condition in (8), it follows that a secret key can be
distilled from copies of ρABA′B′ only when l becomes very
large, since tr[σ1σ2] ∝ 2−l.
IV. DISTILLING A SECRET KEY BY THE
CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION
We now apply a classical key distillation protocol to
distill a secret key from the states in (3). The classical
protocol involves in two-way communication, the advan-
tage distillation plus one-way information reconciliation.
It is worth to note here that, as we have mentioned in
Sec. II, when the key parts are measured in the computa-
tional basis, the ccq correlations are the same in both the
original state ρABA′B′ and the twisted one UρABA′B′U
†
with any twisting operation U [10]. Therefore, in order to
analyze the key distillability of the original state, one can
equivalently consider the ccq correlations in the twisted
state.
To be explicit, suppose that a twisting operation is ap-
plied such that the key part results in the state in (4). If
the state in (4) is separable, no secret key can be distilled
since two honest parties share no secret correlations. The
precondition for key distillation is that the state in (4)
is entangled. For the full generality, Eve is assumed to
hold the purification of the state σAB in (4),
|ψ〉ABE =
∑
i
√
λi|φi〉AB|Ei〉E , (10)
where |Ei〉 are orthogonal basis for Eve’s Hilbert space.
Alice and Bob measure their key parts in the computa-
tional basis and share the following probability distribu-
tions,
pAB(i, j) = tr[|i, j〉AB〈i, j| ⊗ IE |ψ〉ABE〈ψ|]. (11)
For each measurement outcome (i, j), Eve possesses the
following state
|ei,j〉E = 〈i, j|AB ⊗ IE |ψ〉ABE√
pAB(i, j)
. (12)
Then, the ccq correlations can be seen in the ccq state
ρABE as follows,
ρABE =
∑
i,j
pAB(i, j)|ij〉AB〈ij| ⊗ |eij〉〈eij |. (13)
Sharing secret correlations, two honest parties now
proceed to classical communication to distill a secret key.
Here, we consider the advantage distillation that involves
two-way classical communication [14] plus one-way infor-
mation reconciliation, which is known as the most toler-
ant classical key distillation protocol to date. The advan-
tage distillation works as follows. Alice first generates a
secret bit sA and computes a list xi = sA + ai with her
measurement outcomes ai, i = 1, · · · , N , and then an-
nounces xi through a public and authenticated channel
so that Bob can also compute bi + xi = yi. Bob will see
that his resulting values are either all the same or not,
and reply to Alice with acceptance or rejection, depend-
ing on the computation result. He says acceptance if all
yi are the same, and proceeds to apply one-way error cor-
rection and privacy amplification to the accepted values.
Otherwise, two honest parties leave from the failed val-
ues and perform the protocol with another values again.
The advantage distillation can be understood as a post-
selection processing to take bits having stronger corre-
lations. Then, the standard one-way post-processing is
applied. If a secret key is distilled after the one-way post-
processing, then it is concluded that the original state
ρABA′B′ is key-distillable.
Key distillation from the states in (13) using the ad-
vantage distillation followed by one-way post-processing
has been completely analyzed in Refs. [15, 16]. The key
distillability condition is that, a secret key can be dis-
tilled from copies of the ccq state in (13) if the ccq state
satisfies that
|〈e00|e11〉|2 > pAB(0, 1) + pAB(1, 0)
pAB(0, 0) + pAB(1, 1)
. (14)
In terms of the parameters λj in (10), the condition is,
(λ1−λ2)2 > (λ3+λ4)(λ1+λ2). Then, straightforwardly
using the relation in (5), we arrive at the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. A secret key can be distilled from
copies of the state ρABA′B′ using the advantage distil-
lation followed by the one-way post-processing if shield
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FIG. 1: Those bounds of PPT and key-distillable in the ex-
ample are shown. The range of separable means that the key
part in (4) is separable, meaning the range that no secret key
can be distilled.
sates satisfy the following condition,
‖σ1 − σ2‖2 > ‖σ3 + σ4‖‖σ1 + σ2‖. (15)
The proposition 2 also shows that, for a particular
choice of separable shield states such that (8) holds, en-
tanglement already implies that a secret key can be dis-
tilled. This is because, by the orthogonality condition
(8), the entanglement condition (6) coincides to the se-
curity condition in (15). Note that, the security condition
in (15) is in general stronger than the entanglement con-
dition in (6). Therefore, there exists a gap between en-
tanglement condition and the key distillation condition.
We now compare two key distillability conditions in
propositions 1 and 2. In fact, all quantum states which
can be distilled to a secret key by the recurrence proto-
col can also be distilled to a secret key by the classical
distillation protocol. Therefore, quantum states in much
wider range are key-distillable.
Proposition 3. Let SR and SC denote the sets
of quantum states that can be distilled to secret by
the recurrence protocol and by the considered classical
distillation, respectively. Then, it holds that SR ⊂ SC .
Proof. Suppose that ρABA′B′ ∈ SR, meaning that
the condition (8) is fulfilled. The classical distilla-
tion protocol is applied to those key-distillable states.
Since shield states fulfill (8), the security condition
(15) coincides to the condition that σAB is entangled
in (6). For key distillation, it is the precondition
that σAB is entangled, and therefore the security condi-
tion (15) is fulfilled. This clearly shows that SR ⊂ SC . 
We now reconsider the example in Ref. [17] with the
classical distillation protocol.
Example. Let us revisit the state ρABA′B′ with shield
states in (9). Then, from its twisted state, the state σAB
is entangled if p ≤ p1 where, for j = 1, 2,
pj =
1
2
[(1 − 1
2l
)j + 1]−1. (16)
The original state ρABA′B′ remains positive under
partial transpose if p ≤ 1/3. From the key distillability
condition in (15), a secret key can be distileld from
copeis of the state by the classical distillation protocol
if p > p2. This shows that the state ρABA′B′ is key-
distillable with shield states for all l ≥ 1, contrast to
the case that the recurrence protocol is applied, where
a secret key is distilled only when l is very large. Note
that as l goes very large, p2 converges to p1. All these
are depicted in Fig. (1).
Based on the results from propositions 1 and 2, we
also consider the example shown in Ref. [17], where a
key-distillable bound entangled state in 4⊗ 4 dimension
is provided. Let us denote the state by ρ4×4ABA′B′ . The
state is of the form in (3) with the following shield states
σ1 =
q1
4
(|00〉〈00|+ |φ3〉〈φ3|),
σ2 =
q1
4
(|11〉〈11|+ |φ4〉〈φ4|)
σ3 =
q2
2
|χ+〉〈χ+|, σ4 = q2
2
|χ−〉〈χ−| (17)
where
|χ±〉 = 1
2
(
√
2±
√
2|00〉 ±
√
2∓
√
2|11〉).
In Ref. [17], the ratio of q1 and q2 was found such that the
state ρ4×4ABA′B′ provides ccq correlations having a positive
secret key rate with the standard one-way protocol of
error correction and privacy amplification.
The state ρ4×4ABA′B′ can actually be distilled to a secret
key in a wider range of q1 and q2 if the classical distilla-
tion, advantage distillation plus one-way post-processing,
is applied. First, note that the twisted state σ4×4AB of state
ρ4×4ABA′B′ (see, (4)) is entangled if q1 > q2. Then, from
propositions 1 and 2, the key-distillability can be seen
explicitly as follows. Suppose that q1 > q2. By the recur-
rence protocol, the state ρ4×4ABA′B′ can be approximated
arbitrarily close to a private state since two states, σ1
and σ2, are orthogonal. Also, by the classical distillation
and from the proposition 2, the state can be distilled to a
secret key if the twisted state σ4×4AB is entangled. There-
fore, the state ρ4×4ABA′B′ is actually key-distillable in the
much wider range, for q1 > q2.
V. WHEN THE WHITE NOISE IS ADDED
Finally, let us now consider the case that white noise
is added to the original state ρABA′B′ , which is related
with the case where a small error appears while or after
identifying shared states by the LOCC scheme in [10]:
ρǫABA′B′ = (1− ǫ)ρABA′B′ + ǫ1ABA′B′ , (18)
where 1ABA′B′ is the normalized identity operator. The
state can be rewritten in a form (3) with shield states σǫi
in the following
σǫi = (1− ǫ)σi + ǫ1A′B′/4. (19)
It is clear that shield states σǫ1 and σ
ǫ
2 under the small
perturbation do not satisfy the orthogonality even in the
5case that the original ones σ1 and σ2 might be orthog-
onal. Therefore, as the orthogonality is the key distilla-
bility condition for the case that the recurrence protocol
is applied, a secret key cannot be distilled from states in
(3) by the recurrence protocol when the white noise is
added to the states.
When the classical distillation protocol is applied, from
the proposition 2, a secret key can be distilled from copies
of state, ρǫABA′B′ , if the following satisfies,
‖σ1 − σ2‖2 > ‖σ3 + σ4‖‖σ1 + σ2‖+ ǫ
(1− ǫ)2 . (20)
Therefore, the classical distillation protocol can still work
although the white noise is added to the original state.
As an example, we apply the above security condition to
the example in Ref. [8]: a secret key can be distilled if
p >
p2
2
[1 + (1 − 2
p2
ǫ
(1− ǫ)2 )
1/2], (21)
where p2 is given in (16).
VI. CONCLUSION
To summarize, we have investigated the key distill-
ability of shielded two-qubit states using the quantum
protocol, the recurrence protocol, and the classical dis-
tillation protocol, the advantage distillation plus one-way
post-processing. We then derive the security conditions,
respectively, and show that entangled states in a much
wider range are in fact key-distillable. We also reconsider
known key-distillable bound entangled states shown in
Refs. [8] and [17]. It is also shown that, for a particu-
lar choice of shield states such that σ1 and σ2 in (3) are
orthogonal, entanglement immediately implies that a se-
cret key can be distilled. Fianlly, the classical distillation
is shown to be robust when the white noise is added to
original quantum state.
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